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Old Report Carries Familiar Themes

BY BARRY SCHWEID.

WASHINETON

Despite a Soviet record of trickery, distortion and intransigeance, the risks of nuclear war require a massive American effort to reach an arms control agreement with the Kremlin, warned a secret government report.

The admonition wasn't sounded last week, last year or even a decade ago.

It was prepared in January 1953 by then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson for Dwight D. Eisenhower, the new president.

The problems and the recommendations contained in the report \_ portions of which have been released in the Harvard quarterly International Security \_ have a contemporary ring.

"Flexibility \_ freedom of action \_ seems to us, indeed, to be the first basic requirement for American policy in the present situation," the Acheson report said.

"It would be very easy for this nation, in the face of the double dangers of Soviet totalitarianism and atomic war, to let events develop so that in the end a catastrophe of some sort becomes unavoidable."

At the time Acheson had the report prepared, the Cold War was straining U.S.-Soviet relations. The United States held a commanding lead in atomic weapons, but the Soviets had tested two or three bombs.

The nuclear arms race was on.

The secretary wanted to pass some advice on the nuclear issue to Eisenhower, so in April 1952 he asked a panel to study the matter. It was headed by J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Princeton physicist advising the Atomic Energy Commission. Other members included Vannevar Bush or the Carnegie Institution; John S. Dickey and Joseph Johnson, ex-State Department disarmament specialists; and Allen Dulles, who was to direct the Central Intelligence

Their report was circulated within the government but withheld from the public. A slightly sanitized version was released recently to an assistant to McGeorge Bundy, a former U.S. national security adviser, and it now appears in the Harvard quarterly.

"The general record of the Soviet Union in diplomacy is one in which the meaning of words has been distorted, the privacy of discussions violated, and trust repaid by trickery," the 1953 report said.

The Iron Curtain was biocking any real/discussion or arms control "since there can be no confidence in any agreement if there is not some way of finding cuttat 1885 phodem, clifen - the test of the talks of the test of Geneva, where the United States and the Soviet Union are attempting to negotiate an agreement on strategic arms levels.